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substituted for "rateable" value for the purposes of local taxation, the central premises would pay on £80, and the suburban on only £20. The advantage of this change would be twofold. The increased burden would do no harm to the fully developed central site, which ought, indeed, equitably to bear it. So far from hindering such sites from being developed, the pressure of the site value rate would be salutary in securing that they should be properly utilized. On the other hand, by freeing sites on the outskirts from a burden which ought not to be imposed on them we should remove the main hindrance to suburban development and it would be possible for houses to be supplied steadily to meet the demand for them at reasonable prices.

This is Mr. Smith's argument as we understand it, and it deserves the serious consideration of everyone interested in the Housing Question.

CROMPTON LLEWELYN DAVIES.

LONDON.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. An Introduction to the Philosophical Study of Politics. By Alfred H. Lloyd, Author of "Citizenship and Salvation" and "Dynamic Idealism." Ann Arbor: George Wahr, Publisher, 1899.

Professor Lloyd conceives it to be the duty of the philosophy of history "to examine the fundamental data of history, the general facts or the general principles that every historian takes for granted or is very likely to take for granted, and in the examination to determine how far they are really and consistently thinkable" (p. 12). "Determine what time is, what an event in time is, what causation and individuality and progress are, and what society is, and universal history is bound to stand before you" (p. 13). And this universal history is of interest because the knowledge of its laws liberates the life of the present from the bondage of necessity. To know the laws of the life we live is to live that life spontaneously. Knowledge can turn a necessary result into a motive and "where motive and result are one, freedom need not be questioned" (p. 15). But to find the laws of our present life in the events of the past is to presuppose a unity of present and past. "Not those that are now gone once lived and we live, but they and we are living; they in us and we with them. When, looking over the past, we think of freedom or spontaneity or responsibility as

belonging to the makers of the past, we are in a very real and a very important sense, in a sense that is not a poetic fancy but a wholly prosaic experience, turning the creatures of yesterday into our own contemporaries. More than one writer has been keen enough to see that contemporaneity sets the temporal bounds of history, and a more important principle for the philosophy of history would be hard to find" (pp. 16, 17). Time is thus not an independent quiddity; it is not a framework within which reality is accidentally set; it is "an abstraction of some *essential* character in the sphere of the real" (p. 27). "Time is an element in experience that expresses abstractly at once the necessity—the past—and the opportunity—the future—that a world of related differences naturally affords" (p. 35). This view of time does away with all sudden beginnings and endings; every event is organically connected with every other event" (p. 27). We seem thus committed to a particular view of causation. "To identify cause and effect is to contemporize past and future" (p. 41). "No antecedent is cause apart from its whole environment and relating it to its whole environment is exactly what effects its contemporization with its effect" (p. 44). "Causation is nothing more nor less than organic differentiation" (p. 47). "Change of any sort, finally, is of the same character" (p. 50). "If reality is organic, unity and difference being essential to each other, no other conception of change is necessary than this that makes it consist in the permanence, the expression and maintenance, of that which is" (p. 53).

Now, this whole conception of time and causation is philosophically important as offsetting an atomistic view of the world. But there is danger that the offset may be in itself as sadly lacking in balance as its counterpoise. A reader of this book might very easily get the impression that Professor Lloyd, in his reaction against the view of time as a disjointed sequence, has gone over to a view of time as not being a principle of sequence at all, and this simply because time is a principle of continuity and coherence. This impression, if I can read aright between the lines, would be a false one, but the fault would not altogether lie with the reader. Professor Lloyd is nothing if he is not obscure. He has a passion for paradox. He believes that "there are times when clearness is a fault" (p. 207), and without question it is at such times that he writes his books. His general point of view is that the world, whether in space or in time or in any other of its features, is one; and this unity is to be found in the fact that every part of the

world is what it is by virtue of its organic relation to every other part. In general outline, this view seems to me to be eminently satisfactory; but what is needed is to work this view out in detail, and in this task, or rather in the exposition of its results, Professor Lloyd does not seem to have been successful. No doubt the fault is in the expression and not in the thought. But books presumably are intended to bring thought to expression. The opacity of all Professor Lloyd's writing, and the offhand way in which, in this book, he refers to historical events as proving abstract formulas, when the connection between event and formula is what one wishes to have made out, lead to despair rather than to enlightenment. Without denying the profundity of the author's view or the smartness of his paradoxes, I should seriously protest that a philosophical book should not sacrifice clearness to paradox, or insight to mystification.

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CRANMER AND THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND. By Arthur D. Innes, M. A., Sometime Scholar of Oriel College, Oxford. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1900. Pp. xix., 199.  
WESLEY AND METHODISM. By F. J. Snell, M. A. (Oxon.) Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1900. Pp. x., 243.

These two volumes are the first issues of a new series entitled, "The World's Epoch-Makers," published under the editorship of Mr. Oliphant Smeaton. The subjects of the twenty-eight volumes, which make up the series, are, for the most part, well chosen. But at times the selection of the "epoch-makers" seems arbitrary and artificial, and we may reasonably hope that editor and publishers will yet add others to make the series less abrupt and more satisfying. Why, for example, should place not be found for Plotinus? And why not for Abelard and for Aquinas? Why not, too, for Melanchthon and for Knox? Why should the "Herschels" appear, and neither a Kepler, nor a Galileo, nor a Newton, nor a Darwin? Then, again, we have Descartes, but not Malebranche, Spinoza, but not Leibnitz. We have Rousseau, too, and neither Maine de Biran, nor Cousin, nor Comte, nor Renouvier. Besides, there are many other names, some of which at least might have been included, as, for example, Berkeley, Hobbes, Fénelon, Locke, Butler, Rosmini, Carlyle, Vinet, Mill, Schopen-